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FROM BARTELL TO ERICKSON TO MAULDIN:
TITLE VII'S EFFECT ON INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
CONTRACEPTIVES
BY MARl K. CANIA
What started out as a joke to undermine the entire Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has developed into a powerful tool to help
women throughout the country.' When the Civil Rights Act was
proposed, its goal was to help alleviate the black/white problems
that the Civil Rights movement brought to a head. The issue of
gender equality was not one that many legislators were concerned
about at the time.2 But somehow, over many objections, when the
law did pass, women were included. Despite its bumpy start the
law has provided women not only with better access to
employment, but also to better terms and conditions once in the
labor force.
While at first the ways in which Title VII would benefit
women were unclear, as demonstrated in the Supreme Court's
1976 decision in General Electric Company v. Gilbert,3 Congress
and the Supreme Court have both taken a role in defining the
protections afforded to women by Title VII. In response to the
Supreme Court's holding in Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII
1 Emily Rushing, So Much for Equality in the Workplace: The Ever-Changing
Standards for Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title Vfl, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1389, 1392 n.23 (2001). Discrimination based on sex "was not included in the
original codification, it was added at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives." Id. at 1392. In addition, the inclusion of sex as a protected
class under the bill was a joke or "an accident, at best. It was added as an
amendment one day before House passage of the Civil Rights Act; its
proponents included a number of Congressmen opposed to the Act, who hoped
that the inclusion of 'sex' would highlight the absurdity of the effort as a whole,
and contribute to its defeat." Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813,
816-17 (1991).
2 See Rushing, supra note 1, at 1392.
3 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that General
Electric Company's policy excluding pregnancy benefits was not
discriminatory).
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in 1978 to include pregnancy as a protected class. 4 Given this
status, discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or a related
medical condition is considered discrimination based on sex.5 This
important modification to the law revoked the majority decision in
Gilbert.6 The opinion of the three dissenting Justices in the Gilbert
decision, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, was instrumental
in encouraging reform to Title VII.
7
In a dissent to Justice Rehnquist's majority decision Justice
Brennan criticized the oversimplification of General Electric's
insurance plan.8 The majority conveniently ignored the finding of
the District Court that a motivating factor in the disability plan was
a discriminatory attitude toward women. 9 It is clear that the goal
of Title VII is to end discriminatory employment practices so it
boggles the mind that this would slip through the cracks when the
case was decided by the Supreme Court. Further, the denial of
coverage for pregnancy was "neutral neither on its face nor in its
intent."'  In addition, as Justice Brennan's dissent asserts,
"[s]urely it offends common sense to suggest ... that a
classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum,
strongly 'sex related.""'
The dissent by Justice Stevens further emphasizes the
discriminatory nature of General Electric's rule regarding
absenteeism. 12  This rule excludes disabilities arising from
pregnancy from General Electric's "disability plan which pays
weekly nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits."' 13  As
Justice Stevens points out, General Electric's rule in and of itself
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, amended by Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2002) (amended 1978).
5 1d.
6 See id.
7 See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1270 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
8 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 150.
10 Id.
"Id. at 149.
12 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127.
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discriminates on the basis of sex.14 If the rule is based on the
ability to become pregnant, which is something only women can
do, then the rule is based solely on sex and, as such, should be
declared in violation of Title VII. 15 The notion seems simple
today; women can get pregnant, men cannot. Therefore,
discrimination based on pregnancy must be discrimination against
women. Unfortunately, this is not how the Supreme Court saw the
situation in the late 1970's when they made the decision in Gilbert.
Within the last few years employer-based health insurance
programs have continued to be tested under Title VII. One of the
most prominent cases in this area was Erickson v. Bartell Drug
Company.16 Erickson was seen as a victory for employees, since it
declared, "Bartell's prescription drug plan discriminates against
Bartell's female employees by providing less complete coverage
than that offered to male employees."17 In Erickson, employees of
Bartell Drug Company were denied coverage of prescription
contraceptives, such as birth control pills, Norplant, Depo-Provera,
intra-uterine devices, and diaphragms.1 8 As a result of this denial
of coverage, a group of women brought suit against their employer
to declare the policy a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.19 Based on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), the
District Court for Washington declared the policy to be a violation
of Title VII. 2  This holding shows a distinct change in attitudes
toward women's rights under Title VII.
In reaching this conclusion, the District Court cites the
specific language of the PDA, which grew in part out of the
dissenting opinions in General Electric Company v. Gilbert.21
With the implementation of the PDA in 1978 it became easier for
courts to determine the limitations on the powers granted in the
14 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"5 Id. at 162.
16 Erickson, 141 F.Supp.2d at 1266.
" Id. at 1276-77.
18 Id. at 1268.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1276-77 (finding that insurance coverage of prescription drugs must
provide equally comprehensive coverage for both men and women).
Id. at 1270.
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Civil Rights Act regarding discrimination because of or on the
basis of sex.
Perhaps in an effort to bring the holding in Erickson to
other jurisdictions, a complaint was filed in the Central District of
California with very similar allegations. 22 The case, Alexander v.
American Airlines, Inc., which was moved to the District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, turned out to have an opposite
result to Erickson, despite their factual similarities.23 One of the
problems that led to this result was that the plaintiff in Alexander
was seeking coverage for infertility treatments in addition to pap
smears and contraceptives. 24  Infertility treatments were not
mentioned in the relief sought by the plaintiffs in Erickson, and the
court in Alexander did not see a parallel that would link these
treatments to contraceptives.
25
The plaintiff in Alexander was a flight attendant employed
by American Airlines.26  American Airlines had a number of
different medical plans available to its employees which include
"four standard plans, a Point-of-Service Plan and an HMO. 27
Plaintiff alleged that American Airlines discriminated against
women because the standard health plans do not cover annual pap
smear tests, infertility treatments or contraceptives.28 According to
plaintiff, this denial of coverage was in violation of the Civil
Rights Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act.29
In response to the plaintiffs allegations, American Airlines
asserted that since the health plans are "equally accessible to all
employees, it does not discriminate as a matter of law."
30
22 See Alexander v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4:02-CV-0252-A, 2002 WL
731815, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22 2002).
23 Id. (holding in part that the insurance policy that did not cover annual pap
smear exams, contraceptive medications or devices, or infertility treatments was
not a violation of Title VII).
24 Id. at * 1.
25 See id. at *3.




30 Id. at *2.
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According to the provisions of the health plan, "annual routine
physical exams are not covered," whether they are for men or
women.3 1 This also excludes the routine screening for prostate
cancer that the plaintiff had alleged was available to men.32 The
health plan clearly states that pap smears and prostate cancer
screenings are covered if medically necessary, but not if routine.
33
This belies the plaintiffs claim for disparate treatment since the
treatment is clearly the same for both sexes. While it is
unfortunate that these important screenings are denied universally,
it is not a violation of Title VII.
Another problem faced by the plaintiff in Alexander was
the fact that she had never actually suffered an injury under the
portion of the policy that denied coverage for contraceptives.
34
Since the plaintiff never actually "sought benefits under the plan
for contraceptives," she was not injured by the policy, whether or
not it was discriminatory.35 Since she was never injured by the
policy, she has no standing to pursue the claims based on denial of
contraceptive coverage.
36
The most recent attempt to define women's rights in the
realm of health insurance coverage is the case of Mauldin v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc..37 This case is still in the very early stages and
could end up settling out of court. However, the plaintiff's motion
for class certification has been granted, which will allow her to
bring her case as a class-action lawsuit against her employer, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart).38 The plaintiff, Lisa Smith Mauldin,
a Wal-Mart employee since August 29, 1996. 39 According to
Mauldin's complaint, she pays $29.84 per month for birth control
pills. 40 The plaintiffs basis for her claim of sex discrimination
3' Id. at *3.32 Alexander, 2002 WL 731815, at *3.
33 id.




37 See Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIV.A.1:01-CV2755JEC, 2002
WL 2022334 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002).
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includes a claim for disparate treatment on the basis of sex and a
"claim for disparate impact, on the ground that Wal-Mart's facially
neutral policy of excluding coverage for prescription
contraceptives in the Plan has an adverse disparate impact on
women, because only women use prescription contraceptives.
The approval of the plaintiffs class certification is
promising, but it is only one small step in the battle that must be
fought. In order to change Wal-Mart's policy of denial of
coverage for contraceptives, the court would have to declare this
policy a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However,
even if this policy was found to be discriminatory under Title VII,
there still may be appeals available to Wal-Mart that would allow
the company to delay any change in their health insurance plans.
In addition, if Wal-Mart could find a non-discriminatory reason for
denying coverage of contraceptives, they would be able to escape
the violation of Title VII.
One of the few encouraging pieces for the plaintiff is the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) December
2000 decision, concluding that failure to cover prescription
contraceptives constitutes sex discrimination if other comparable
42prescriptions are covered. Clearly there can be some argument as
to what is considered a "comparable prescription," but overall this
decision could prove helpful for the plaintiff in Mauldin.
While the final decision as to the issues in Mauldin is yet to be
determined, it will be interesting to see the way that Wal-Mart
defends its policy of excluding contraception from insurance
coverage. Wal-Mart has been notoriously against contraception, as
shown by their refusal to carry and fill prescriptions for emergency
contraception, commonly known as the "morning after pill.
''4
Since the amendment to Title VII which added the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 the Supreme Court has had
41 id.
42 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement Guidance
Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187, at *5
(Dec. 14, 2000).
43 See Feminist Majority Foundation Online, FDA Silent on Over-the-Counter
Emergency Contraception (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=6334.
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the dubious task of determining when employment policies and
insurance plans discriminate on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions. In many cases these decisions have
helped women throughout the country have greater access to
prescription contraceptives. If nothing else, this statute allows
some women to stand on a more equal footing with men which is
always a step in the right direction. There will always be critics in
employers who feel they should not have to pay for these types of
programs. However, these same employers may be benefiting
from the labor of women on prescription contraceptives, as the
women can then work a greater percentage of the time since they
are not getting pregnant as often as they would without
prescription contraceptives.

